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 Introduction  
 
Although now largely remembered as a philosopher, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-
1716) gave himself the life goal of finding an answer to the entire spectrum of European moral, 
sectarian and political issues of his time. Leibniz truly feared for his beloved Europe’s future as 
well as its present. In his political memorandum of 1670, he summarized the challenges of his 
times as follows: 
“These consist in a badly established trade and manufacture; in an entirely debased 
currency; in the uncertainty of law and in the delay of all legal actions; in the worthless 
education and premature travels of our youth; in an increase of atheism ; in our morals, 
which are as it were infected by a foreign plague; in the bitter strife of religions; all of 
which taken together may indeed slowly weaken us and, if we do not oppose it in good 
time, may in the end completely ruin us; yet we hope, will not bring us down all at 
once..”1  
Religious war in particular was Leibniz’ great fear. Leibniz was born towards the end of the 
Thirty-Years War (1618-1648) and he saw the religious antagonisms arising from the 
Reformation as the greatest threat to Europe and, particularly, his own divided region of the Holy 
Roman Empire. He fixated on solving this great issue, and his solution was ultimately as bold as 
the problem.  
  Although Leibniz is usually considered a largely secular thinker, in the eighteenth 
century he proposed a plan for the nothing less than the mass conversion of China to 
Christianity. Rather than being primarily based on the expansion of Christianity, however, his 
goal was, this essay will argue, intended as a model for a modern reformation of the religion and 
morality crisis of Christian Europe. Following the basic tenets of his philosophy, he held that the 
merger of the vast systems of Chinese ancient natural theology and European culture would 
                                               
1 Gottfreid W. Leibniz, Paul Ritter,ed., “Securitas Publica,”Gottfied Wilhelm Leibniz: Samtliche Schriften 
und Briefe, herausgegeben von der Preusischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 4th series, vol. 1, 133. As 
cited in Rudolf W. Meyer,  Leibnitz and the Seventeenth-century Revolution (Cambridge, Eng.: Bowes & 
Bowes, 1952.) 8. 
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create a new form of Christianity and society that could in Europe overcome humanity’s modern 
corrupt factional theology, and in China establish a centralized monotheistic religion After 
learning about a group of Jesuits’, which will later be distinguished as accommodationists, 
attempts at fighting for Chinese doctrines and their rights to be accepted into Europe as 
theologically and philosophically sound materials, Leibniz decided that he could use some 
elements of Chinese natural theology to reform Christianity and restore the glory of God. 
Through merging the two great powers and creating a superstructure connecting the two he 
believed that his plan could provide the parts of the world he cared to save peace, clarity, 
equality and faith. 
It is in large part because of this project that Leibniz was so at odds with the 
insularism of other enlightenment figures. “Leibniz emerges as the only significant 
philosopher of his period(with the exception of Montaigne),” writes Ian Almond in a 
characteristic summary, “to actively research the languages, religious texts, and ethnographies 
of other cultures.”2  We misunderstand Leibniz, however, if we think he did this solely as a 
disinterested intellectual project. His goal was rather the political and religious reform of 
Europe, which was to be initiated by the conversion and consequent reform of China. Only as 
a consequence of this project did Leibniz embark on his admirable project of cultural 
translation between the two world regions. Leibniz made an exemplary effort to search high 
and low for key cultural motifs that incorporate ethically sound and just elements in order for 
their prosperity in a new system, and not just their survival as scholarship.  
However, most importantly, he did indeed do all of this with an open mind: he was 
ready and eager to learn about the foreign, not solely for the purposes of comparing them to 
                                               
2 Ian Almond. “Leibniz, Historicism, and the "Plague of Islam," in Eighteenth-Century Studies 39.4 
(2006): 465. 
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European equivalents or less, but to understand how they work in their respective societies. 
This was not a product of simple good will. At its foundation, Leibniz’s wider philosophy 
entailed both a respect for all forms of human thought and perspective that valued other 
cultures precisely in their differences. Essentially, to put it in the terms of the field of 
computer science which Leibniz is described as founding, different societies represented for 
him different programs or systems for understanding the world, and only by understanding all 
of their interlocking parts in themselves – every aspect of material culture as well as religion -
- could they be properly outlined. In combining the two most complex and comprehensive 
such systems that God had placed on the earth – that of Europe and China – and creating a 
common exchange between them, Leibniz thought he could facilitate nothing less than the 
next stage of human history. Even if his grandiose ambitions were not realized, his 
philosophical work resonated in the literary and scholarly worlds, as he made sure he was 
thorough and fair, in his assessment of foreign cultures and what they offered to this 
Renaissance man with a strong scientific background, and a very analytical method of 
handling information.  
It wasn’t until the publication of the preface to the Novissima Sinica(Latest from 
China)[1697] in which he revealed his intentions for Chinese doctrine. My first chapter argues 
that Leibniz was genuinely interested in solving Europe’s ethics crisis by using China’s natural 
theology, which was only made possible through his faith in his philosophy and his 
understanding of Chinese doctrines. He intended to reform Christianity, respecting his Protestant 
principles, and to incorporate natural theology into it, in an attempt to restore simpler and 
centralized beliefs. For Leibniz, as Patrick Riley notes, the Chinese Emperor was “as just and 
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charitable and as a (more or less) "Platonic" geometer who is as wise as he is charitable.”3 From 
China, Europe would receive this “geometrical” ethics; for China, Europe would export what 
Leibniz took as the rational concept of monotheism as well as traditional European teachings, 
reasonings and sciences. 
The second chapter argues that Leibniz, through the help of his many correspondents, 
found himself growing closer to the Chinese cause, and eventually tried his hardest to redeem the 
Confucianism’s theological identity. He thought that the Chinese were quite advanced in social 
and philosophical domains, and that Europe had to share its superior military and scientific 
knowledge in order to negotiate the details of the great cultural exchange, and rebirth of their 
reformed Christianity.  
Leibniz ultimately failed his mission in part due to the Chinese Rites controversy, a 17th-
18th centurty dispute among Catholic missionaries over the compatibility of Confucian traditions 
with Christian belief. Despite all of the attempts he made in order to restore theological meaning 
he and other accommodationists found in Confucian concepts, mainly its natural philosophies 
and concept of * or Li(order of nature), Holy See eventually decided in 1704 and 1715 that the 
Chinese rites ought to be banned.  
Chapter 3 reveals Leibniz’s true intentions regarding the creation of his reformed, moral, 
and culturally advanced Euro-Chinese state, and how he believed that this construct could bring 
humanity closer to God, as the possibility of having such a superior civilization could only 
highlight God’s magnificence. This of course was heavily inspired by his visions for complex 
Monadic structures. He directly applied his philosophical vision to creating the perfect society 
which he could use in turn as proof of this philosophy. 
                                               
3 Riley, Patrick, “Leibniz's Political and Moral Philosophy in the Novissima Sinica, 1699-1999,” Journal 
of the History of Ideas Volume 60, Number 2 (April 1999), 217 
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Chapter 1 
European Ethics and Chinese Natural Theology 
 
China, was regarded as a country that had managed to successfully reign over its 
peoples without losing much of its virtues from their ancient doctrines. It wasn’t an openly 
religious state like most European territories, China’s Confucianism has been categorized by 
some as precursor to Christianity, a sort of Stoicism of forces and society, and by others as an 
atheistic philosophical system. China had managed to preserve itself and its ethics in a fashion 
that could only be deemed mysterious to a religious outsider. Leibniz, in time would find 
himself in a sea of texts provided to him by his many correspondents on Chinese culture and 
theology, thus leading him to believe Confucianism had a lot more to offer than any other 
belief system in his quest to provide solutions to European ethical problems of the time. He 
thought that by converting China to Christianity, a reformed Christianity might arise from the 
fusion, with incorporations of natural theological concepts found in ancient Chinese 
doctrines: providing the religion with not only ethical amendments, but also an inclination 
towards rational theology, and an escape from sectarian hostility. 
But why did he give himself this task of solving this so called problem in the first 
place? Or better yet, why was Leibniz even in the business of solving problems to begin with? 
In this chapter, we’ll look at the European origins of Leibniz’ fascination with China, starting 
with the basis of his valuing unbounded curiosity, which developed from both his 
biographical circumstances and, increasingly, his philosophy as whole. We’ll then turn to his 
belief in the role of education and professionalization in society as a whole, where the notion 
of a change of ideas – an Enlightenment – could form the basis of ethics in society. Here 
Leibniz saw the Chinese virtues of Confucianism as serving as a model for this pedagogical 
project, and also saw a means of disseminating the results of this cultural dialog. Finally, 
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we’ll look at one particular discovery that emblematized Leibniz’s belief in the value of this 
cultural transmission: Leibniz’s discovery of the I Ching, and with it the basis of a binary 
system for underlying and system of information – or society. Within the more complex forest 
of the I Ching, Leibniz would also find a model for how two different societies could rest on 
different, but related, algorithms. 
In a letter to Duke John Frederick of Hanover in 1672, Leibniz wrote: “Mainly because 
my parents died so early and I was thus left, almost without any direction, to my studies, I have 
had the good fortune to come upon books of many languages, religions and sciences, yet in no 
proper order; and these I read, being at first impelled by the instinct of delectatio4.”5 As he put it, 
he found delight in learning more and more of other’s perceptions of almost any matter. The 
fascination he had with reaching new recorded thought was reflected in his approach to writing, 
as I will explain further on, Leibniz approached the subjects of his writings as if it were a puzzle. 
At times, they were completely unsolvable like age old philosophical questions regarding man’s 
freedom or God’s omniscience for example, but it is obvious to any reader that Leibniz didn’t 
write to hover or lightly ponder, but to solve.  
In order to establish Leibniz, as a genius of a remarkable background, I will attempt to 
summarize his life before approaching his famous grand cultural exchange, as it provides context 
to my argument underlining his philosophical maturity as his foundation in problem solving. 
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz was born in Leipzig, Electorate of Saxony, 1646, to a Professor of 
Moral Philosophy and Registrar of the University of Leipzig. Leibniz’s father, Friedrich, died 
when little Gottfried was just six years old. His education was overseen by his mother, the 
daughter of a professor of law, and a loyal orthodox Protestant. As a self-proclaimed autodidact, 
                                               
4 Latin for delight, pleasure. 
5 C. J. Gerhardt, trans., Die Philosophieschen Schriften von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (Berlin, 1875-
1890), vol. 1, 57. (As cited in Meyer 87) 
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he was able to enter his father’s library at age seven or eight. Thus started his reading of any 
material he could find and teach himself to read, in more languages than one. His interests got 
increasingly specific as his level of education augmented: “I began to read historians almost as 
soon as I was able to read at all, but as soon as I began to learn logic, I was greatly excited by the 
division and order of thoughts I perceived in it. I immediately noticed, to the extent that a boy of 
13 could, that there must be a great deal in it.”6  Leibniz did not waste much time; enrolling 
himself in to Leipzig University at the young age of 14 he received a doctorate of Law from 
University of Altdorf (he was supposed to receive one from Leipzig University a year earlier but 
the school decided that a twenty year old was far too young to receive such a diploma).7 
After his university years, Leibniz started publishing political and jurisprudential 
commentaries and essays under various pseudonyms, a notion which highlights his eagerness to 
argue and make a difference, not in the hopes of making a name for himself, but to actually 
produce constructive materials. He was given various diplomatic missions, one being a secret 
trip to France, in 1672, which entailed him tricking Louis XIV into invading Egypt and its 
infidels, driving them away from attacking lands Germans had claimed as their own, Leibniz 
intended for this plan to be viewed as a crusade, and an end of inter-Christian hostility.8 The plan 
was abandoned almost immediately, but Leibniz managed to get his patron to allow him to stay 
in Paris for a few extra months.9 He eventually returned to Germany as counselor to Duke 
Johann Friedrich of Brunswick, and settled. The court itself was to experience a meteoric rise 
during, but not necessarily because of, Leibniz’ association with it: In 1692, the Duke of 
                                               
6 Gerhardt, Vol. 7, 516. As cited in Roger Ariew, “G. W. Leibniz, Life and Works.” In  The Cambridge 
Companion to Leibniz. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995,) 18. 
7 Ariew, “G. W. Leibniz, Life and Work,” 20-27. 
8 Steven Nadler, The Best of All Possible Worlds: a Story of Philosophers, God, and Evil (New York: 
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2008), 13. 
9 Ibid. 
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Brunswick became a hereditary Elector of the Holy Roman Empire, thus arguably one of the 
seven most powerful people in central Europe. The British Act of Settlement 1701 designated the 
Electress Sophia, the wife of Johann Friedrich’s brother, and her descent as the royal family 
England, a role they still of course hold.10 In his lifetime, Leibniz, held many titles from mining 
engineer to diplomat, advisor to historian and head librarian, He was quite passionate about what 
he found justifiably necessary and important.  
His interest in Chinese theology, throughout its history, was also a testament to his 
problem seeking and solving character. He found himself in the middle of a grand debate, when 
one of his correspondents asked for his opinion on the Chinese Rites debate, and whether he 
supported Matteo Ricci(1552-1610), one of the first Jesuit missionaries to traveled the land with 
hopes of conversion and rewarding cultural exchange, or Father Longobardi(1559-1654), a Jesuit 
who later took Ricci’s post and along with some colleagues decided that, in short, ancient 
Chinese doctrines shouldn’t be associated with religion, as they were inherently atheistic. 
Ricci argued that Chinese rituals didn’t conflict with Christian values, but Longobardi 
pointed out core differences between the two belief systems, adding the fact that the then modern 
Chinese widespread atheism was problematic, at the very least. Leibniz rolled up his sleeves and 
read more on the subject, and finally concluded that the ancient Chinese doctrine qualified as a 
theology, a point which, for him, further discredited the then atheistic doctrines.11 Leibniz, 
lobbied for the reconsideration of Chinese people as perfectly eligible for missionary missions 
for one last time in 1716, and died shortly after on the same year’s November 14th. 
                                               
10 Look, Brandon C., "Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 
2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/leibniz/>. 
11 Ariew,“G. W. Leibniz, Life and Works,” 37. 
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Gottfried Leibniz achieved the privilege to be known as a well-read man at a very 
young age. He found solace in reading whatever he could find that peaked his interests first in 
his father’s library, and then at school. He was accepted to his father’s former employer, the 
University of Leipzig, as a fourteen year old adolescent. Rudolf W. Meyer, a Swiss 
philosopher, found Leibniz’s childhood to be quite interesting, as most should given the 
unusual intelligence the future scientist showed in his appetite for knowledge and solving 
puzzles. It must be said that his surprising independence and attitude towards information he 
would encounter from libraries and authoritative doctrine, as remarked by Meyer is nothing 
shy of impressive12. Yet, the more one reads into Leibniz’s life, the less surprising his 
worldliness gets, as we become conditioned to expect deeper thought and incredible internal 
and external associations between both the material and immaterial.  
 The key to understanding Leibniz’s way of thinking rests on his childhood. Leibniz’s 
earliest recorded thoughts were on a rigid system of categories, focusing on criticising dogmatic 
tradition. Little Leibniz’s passion for looking to answer his own questions arose from the lack of 
information and academic stimulation provided by his school. The future scientist, philosopher 
and historian was conditioned to read and read, in order to find answers: “[t]he boys world was a 
world of books[,] [l]ater on it was to be also a world of letters; yet his enormous European 
correspondence too was ultimately dependent upon the world of books.”13 Leibniz’s professors 
and peers witnessed his vast knowledge base and his ability to effortlessly differentiate more 
sustainable and reliable information from the rest that was being passed down to him at school, 
resulting in his inclination to seek sources outside of his schools.14 Leibniz consciously or 
                                               
12  Rudolf W. Meyer,  Leibnitz and the Seventeenth-century Revolution (Cambridge, Eng.: Bowes & 
Bowes, 1952.) 86. 
13 Meyer, Leibnitz and the Seventeenth-century Revolution, 86. 
14 Meyer, Leibnitz and the Seventeenth-century Revolution, 86-87. 
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subconsciously elevated his critical reading and writing skills, in a most impressive manner, 
especially considering how he was able to separate dogma from more independent thought. This 
could very well be considered the beginning of his passion for problem solving. It is more than 
evident to me, that this great thinker was more than capable to assess pieces of information, 
theories, reasonings, truths and apply refurbished and reconceptualized ideas in the domains he 
felt most appropriate, especially when it comes to Europe’s then contemporary and future legacy.  
Whether or not he consciously changed his opinions, or contradicted his previous stances 
completely over the course of his lifetime is debatable. Yet, his intentions were not oriented 
towards gaining fame or much fortune: for he desired to further expand on subjects that had to be 
discussed thoroughly, and for the good of the public. A public, which grew and shifted quite like 
him and his views over the years. Self-contradiction, a theme that is witnessed time and again in 
his essays, should be considered a sign of intelligence: we learn new ideas, reasonings and truths 
from every experience, which is why it is not possible to continuously interpret an event or state 
the same way on each re-encounter or re-experience. Leibniz’s tendencies to change his opinions 
and reasonings, ideas that he considered most valid but perhaps not true due to the nature of the 
claim and its reliance on tangent subjects’ validities, made him what he is considered today: a 
renaissance man, unafraid of making his many opinions public. 
 In 1697, Leibniz published a book titled Novissima Sinica(News from China), with the 
subtle purpose of increasing the support of Christian missions in China. Leibniz’s goal in writing 
this preface was in hope of persuading Peter the Great of Russia to help with the travel that was 
required of Jesuits that were eager to commute to China, his goal was for the tsar to allow the 
missionaries to pass through Russia as they found the traditional sea rout to be rather long and 
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hazardous.15 Leibniz was a Protestant who supported Catholic missionaries in China, and he 
showed his support through the book once more in his praising of the Chinese ruler of the time, 
making his views on and intentions for China abundantly clear. At this point in the bottom of the 
seventeenth century, Leibniz’s interest in learning more about Chinese culture through his Jesuit 
correspondents which will be further discussed in chapter 2, laid the groundwork for his mass 
conversion idea. By shedding light on Chinese culture and theology thanks to his rather objective 
assessments and clear endorsement of Chinese morality, it was only a matter of time before he 
himself made the connections. Now that the answer was made accessible to the public, it was 
time for the right questions to be introduced. But before that, let’s take another look at his 
background in practical thinking as well as his passion for problem solving. 
What makes this great man so interesting and likeable is summarized here: “[t]o him the 
aim of reflection was not the creation of a closed system, nor the formulation of a doctrine, but 
the critical elucidation of a complex concrete situation.”16 . He wouldn’t have been worried that 
today he isn’t regarded as a professional philosopher, as if such a title could encapsulate what a 
philosopher truly does. However, Leibniz was never what he was after. He quite plainly enjoyed 
to solve problems, mysteries, high density situations, and puzzles of any sort. It had been that 
way since the very beginning of his school years. And his attitude towards foreign concepts 
thereby was always welcoming, for it made it easier for him to envision them to be utilized in 
some way or another, to place them in fitting Eurocentric settings in order to understand them.  
Leibniz was not a shy man, he wasn’t afraid to call unjustifiable dogma ‘vulgar 
prejudices’, he criticized, at a great extent, what he called superficial and empty thinking brought 
                                               
15 John Albert White, and Donald F. Lach. "The Preface to Leibniz' Novissima Sinica." Philosophy East 
and West 7, no. 3/4 (1957): 154.
 
16 Meyer, Leibnitz and the Seventeenth-century Revolution, 101 
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on by libertins and Cartesians  and their school syllabi.17 Leibniz had autonomy in what he read 
and felt he must learn, in an autobiographical note he made it clear that he was to learn all there 
was to be offered in the realm of the sciences, and reach all of its principles, to him this was key 
in working everything else out.18 This highlights his identity as a man of science and a thinker 
who must rely on scientific principles, in his method of thinking. Education was a very important 
topic for him, especially considering his youth and the lack of proper scholarly, or simply 
informative by his standards, materials that he had to eventually search for in others’ libraries. 
Weigel, a former professor to young Leibniz, had slightly different educational ideals for 
Germany, when Weigel was planning out what he called “Collegium Artis Consultorum”, for 
which he had formulated very specific syllabi Leibniz was asked to comment on his work. 19To 
my surprise, Leibniz, at no point, shied away from criticising Weigel’s plans, he criticized his 
syllabi claiming they focused too much on the artificial and not enough on the natural, he also 
criticized the weakness of the proposed name, stating that often times ideas got rejected for their 
inadequacy.20 It is important to establish how important Leibniz’s criticism on education really 
is, as he was a genius autodidact who went out of the comfort zone of his schools to be able to 
access the knowledge he wanted. From a young age, he implicitly shifted his approach to 
everything, as he was conditioned to do so by his environment and the lack of resources his 
school just could not provide to him during his first stage of intellectual development. He felt 
that a change was needed in the education system but that the examples of refined systems were 
too impractical, ideal or vague for people to actually start adapting: 
“ Many a writer before  has remarked on the manner in which in Germany Schools, 
Academies, Education, Peregrination, Guilds and the Sciences are all corrupted and 
                                               
17 Meyer, Leibnitz and the Seventeenth-century Revolution, 87. 
18 Gerhardt, trans., vol. VII, 185. As cited in Meyer, 87. 
19 Meyer, Leibnitz and the Seventeenth-century Revolution, 91. 
20 G. E. Guhrauer, ed.,  Leibniz’s Deutsche Schriften. Berlin 1840. Vol. 2, 473. As cited in Meyer, 200. 
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confounded; there have likewise been many who have made proposals to remedy these 
evils; but these proposals are partly too theoretical, being taken ex Republica Platonis et 
Altantide Baconis[from Plato’s Republic and Bacon’s Atlantis]; partly quite 
incomprehensible, that is Lullian or Metaphysical; and partly ambiguous and dangerous 
to the Republic.”21 
His writings on education should be taken quite seriously as it is testament to the open minded 
and optimistic characteristics, he was a person that made efforts for the good of his public, first 
his fatherland and then Europe. His views on education are important as he was deeply 
unsatisfied by the way his schools couldn’t really teach him what he was so eager to find and 
learn for himself in his father’s library. This man could not have arguably become one of the 
fathers of calculus if his family did not have an abundance of books available at home. Therefore 
there is genuine concern placed here, in his words, for this is a very personal subject for him, and 
so observing what he fought for deepens our understanding of this great man, altogether. 
 
What Leibniz had envisioned for his public was a  specialized professional middle class, 
influenced by a predominantly scientific class, this is based off of a plan he shared with a 
Joachim Becher on education as a tool for political power, by having a central and national 
educational authority and eventually to be able to control the production of classes: “Leibniz’s 
many designs for learned societies and academies were drawn up very much on these lines; and 
both men were impressed by the success of political education in contemporary France.”22 Many 
thinkers were trying to figure out the most efficient way to produce a more learned and 
enlightened society, and the fact that the competitive atmosphere that Europe had been 
cultivating over the course of its existence was nothing but a great advantage and a powerful 
motivator for these commentators.  
                                               
21 Gottfried Leibniz, Bedenken von Aufrichtung einer Akademie oder Societät in Deutschland zum 
Aufnehmen der Künste und Wissenschaften, (1671,) Vol. 1, §13, 546.As cited in Meyer,  92. 
22 Meyer, Leibnitz and the Seventeenth-century Revolution, 91. 
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In 1671, Leibniz published a Memorandum titled On the Founding of a learned Society 
in Germany, in which he contemplated on practical knowledge and further expanded his vision 
for education, in a broader context: 
“All the education[] should tend towards a true, that is ‘practical’, knowledge of God. To 
attain to this knowledge, three kinds of men are necessary: first, a class of ‘orators’ and 
‘priests’, who will disseminate it in the world; secondly, a class of  ‘philosophers’, whose 
task is to elucidate and exhibit harmony of all God-made things; and thirdly, the most 
perfect class of ‘moralists, politicians and statesmen’, who being the tools of God, 
increase perfection of this world, but have to rely for their support upon the two lower 
classes.”23 
 
Leibniz adds religion into the mix, stating that somehow practical knowledge of God should be 
essential, in order for the system to function properly. In short, what he expected from these men 
were faith, harmony and guidance, all of which rested on the assumption that these were all men 
of admirable ethics. Leibniz’s line between material and immaterial isn’t often clear, yet here he 
relies on practical knowledge being the force that must drive societies to higher degrees of 
perfection. His faith in man is projected, as he trusts that others’ faith in God and the vision of 
perfection that one experiences in his or her faith would work as their prime motivation in their 
efforts to create a better education system, reliant on practical knowledge.  
However, in order to even dream about reforming publicly accessible academia, Leibniz 
needed to solve an even greater threat to his beloved societies: unethical behavior. He turned to 
China after realizing the completely different social dynamics in their societies, and became 
fascinated with their codes of social conduct. In his Novissima Sinica Leibniz’s praise and 
demand for Chinese moral practices to be incorporated into European ethics is largely credited to 
their social interactions with one another: 
“But it is desirable that they in turn teach us those things which are especially in our 
interest: the greatest use of practical philosophy and a more perfect manner of living, to 
                                               
23 Meyer, Leibnitz and the Seventeenth-century Revolution, 95. 
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say nothing now of their arts. Certainly the condition of our affairs, slipping as we are 
into ever greater corruption, seems to be such that we need missionaries from the Chinese 
who might teach us the use of practice of natural religion”24  
 
The Chinese virtues of peer tolerance and respect between peasants and servants as Leibniz’s 
goal for European societies and the mending of all Christian’s hostility towards each other. Thus 
merging his clairvoyance and practical thinking into one problem solving expedition, in which he 
desired but one thing: mending Europe. He might not have cared too much for China or their 
social traditions and interactions, or the Muslim Ottoman threat that had been lingering around 
Europe’s Eastern front for far too long, but rather their impact on Europe’s future. Leibniz was 
not a naive thinker, he was always set out on a mission, and I will argue that at times, his 
intentions weren’t as clear as his arguments would suggest.   
Leibniz cannot be named an opportunistic writer, this would be terribly naive mainly due 
to the lack of harboring overwhelmingly selfish, self-promoting or self-rewarding demands and 
personal gain as an outcome to any political or philosophical commentary he has ever made. He 
never owned a business that he tried to promote. He was passionate about the Holy Roman 
Empire and restoring his glory, yet he didn’t fixate on his enemies; he accepted most Christian 
people, especially Catholics.  
“In 1670, Leibniz, aged twenty-four, published his first philosophical work. Marius 
Nizolius of Bersello(in the state of Modena) had published a treatise, De veris principiis, 
et vera ratione philosophandi contra pseudophilosophos (On true principles, and the true 
method of philosophizing against the false philosophers) in 1553. Nizolius’ ‘false 
philosophers’ were all Scholastics, past and present.[...]By the seventeenth century the 
book had fallen into oblivion[, until] Leibniz published it with a preface and some notes 
and used the occasion to show off his general erudition and knowledge of philosophy.”25 
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Nizolius’ book aimed to take a jab at what he considered as corrupted philosophy, he thought 
that terms that couldn’t be rerendered in simpler terms were no longer relevant, he attacked the 
Scholastics on the grounds of their ideas being obscene and language being barbaric26. Leibniz 
used Nizolius’ work to prove, once and for all, that he had sufficient knowledge and technical 
ability to analytically criticize, as well as present his own natural philosophy for the first time, at 
an official capacity. Yet, he didn’t shame Nizolius, instead he made remarks on the work in order 
to correct his thinking and not just scrap it all.  Nizolius used nominalism to persuade his readers 
into thinking that the Scholastics’ views were tainted, Leibniz took this opportunity to “expound 
upon the nature of universals and the general rule, ‘entities must not be multiplied without 
necessity’”27, and that is simply it. This pre-work of Leibniz beautifully summarizes the kind of 
thinker he truly was: he was not a person sailing across books’ and pamphlets’ pages, hoping to 
find some ideas to clash with, he was a hands-on philosopher in constant search of improving 
knowledge as a whole, unafraid of formulating an opinion on what he felt he was informed 
about.  
The preface turned out to be quite beneficial for Leibniz, shortly after his republication of 
Nizolius, he was able to produce his first work in natural philosophy, and followed this with a 
more practical and dangerous attempt at changing the world, as he knew it. After the Thirty 
Years War, Leibniz “came up with various schemes to weaken French power by weakening its 
economy”28, he went so far as to publish a satire on the Sun King, and later tour the country in 
hopes of illuminating himself and others. This early work of his would later be captioned as 
destructive as he his future mission would be to unify Europe, especially in religion and ethics. 
His patriotism did get the best of him, as rivalry between France and the Holy Roman Empire 
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had been at an all time high and Leibniz desired only to lift up his fellow Germans spirits after a 
great loss. This political passion and force that influenced him to leave his country and to 
actually try to solve the Holy Roman Empire’s mortal enemy is another testament to how much 
he cared for his country. He could have easily stayed at home, and published manifestos, 
pamphlets and essays on how France and Navarre deserved nothing less than the absolute worst, 
but he didn’t. 
 After returning from traveling Western Europe for some time, Leibniz returned to his 
fatherland,Hanover, where he settled and served a few Hanover princes, and by doing so became 
increasingly political. Leibniz encountered a very interesting political situation caused by Martin 
Luther and his secularization of Principalities.29 With this movement,  Luther’s Princes obtained 
absolute sovereignty of state and religion, which granted them the power to focus their preferred 
form of Christian to whatever they desired. This allowed religious sect rivalries to become an 
even bigger issue, all the while burning reformed bridges that Luther worked so hard to build in 
the first place. This actuality that Leibniz experienced, first hand and not through a book, is 
perhaps what prompted Leibniz to start harvesting thoughts that would later conclude him to 
believe that all of Europe’s Christianity should merge and finally formulate a Christian Euro-
Chinese superstructure in order to hit many unsuspecting birds with one stone. However, his first 
publications on solving all of these matters, on a much larger scale, weren’t published until the 
last fifteen years of his life. These ideas might have been brewing inside Leibniz’s mind palace, 
but they hadn’t yet reached paper until he was exposed to even more contemporary Christian 
problems and puzzles, later provided to him through Jesuit missionaries. 
Martin Luther had made possible for German Princes to become increasingly 
independent, especially in terms of religion. Luther argued that spiritual and secular or temporal 
                                               
29 Meyer, Leibnitz and the Seventeenth-century Revolution, 67 
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authorities must not cross over, God's spiritual authority may be supreme, but it can't extend on 
to worldly governmental functions. For Luther, every individual was a subject  of the realm of 
God and his or her ruler's state, and that these allegiances are different , and that secularism must 
be upheld.30 Leibniz’s crusade entailed ending domestic Christian rival hostility as well as 
general ethical crises, he aimed to heal all by reforming it completely. He would eventually 
argue that this could easily be achieved through reverting to a simpler natural theology’s input on 
to the contemporary Christians sects by using Ancient Chinese theology. A clever attempt at 
reigniting the flame of decent human beingness the Holy Bible so openly advocates for by 
bringing in Ancients, this plan had worked once in Europe by revisiting in the Greek Classics 
through the phenomenon of quick and easy printing technology. Why couldn’t a similar plan 
work again? 
Leibniz was a Protestant first, and a Christian second. Reformation was in his blood, and 
thereby most of his solutions contained mending, editing and reformulation. Christian traditions 
had the ever present problem of not appealing to its evolving audience’s needs, and Leibniz, 
being the Protestant he was, was keen on mending the traditions, instead of discarding the issue 
completely.Traditionalists and non-traditionalists have been tirelessly clashing since little old 
Eve was just a rib of Adam’s. Luckily for Europe, at one point Leibniz had tried to solve 
Christian tradition problems as well:  “Leibniz hoped to solve the crisis of the Christian tradition 
by subordinating pietist to rational religiousness: …’on ne sauroit aimer Dieu, sans en 
connoistre les perfections, et cette connaissance renferme les principes de la veritable 
piete[we/one can not love God without recognizing [his] perfections, and this knowledge 
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contains the principles of true piety].’”31 The central issue that arose on many separate occasions 
had to do with the validity of the Christian tradition, especially with the “scientific revolution of 
the age, with its new accounts of the Self and the world, [giving] an added weight of 
responsibility to his particular philosophical solution of the problem.”32 At the end of the day, 
religion was there for people to seek refuge and guidance in. The fact that people were taking 
advantage of religion by making arguments that relied on holy passages dragged out of context 
was not a phenomenon a rationalist would get behind. Leibniz, on occasion, was a man of 
modest desires, and undoubtedly the most important of which was the solidarity of his Christian 
brothers, as he genuinely wanted people to be happy and for he believed that it was possible 
through God and his own help to achieve a just and peaceful society: “[i]t is to be ensured that 
men are prudent, endowed with virtue, abundant in faculties, evidently so that they know, will 
and are able to act in the best way” in order to achieve public happiness.33 
The only time, according to Leibniz, in which a Christian would be permitted to release 
himself from the moral clauses that restrict hostility towards others could only be against what he 
categorized as the plague of Islam: “[i]t is difficult to make the world believe that black is white, 
that in order to affirm public peace one has to take up arms which destroy it, and for that good of 
Christianity has to break all the sacred bonds of Christianity” 34 and even then his strong 
opposition to Islam and Muslims can be regarded as a tool that could bring people together in the 
hopes of defeating a common enemy together, as a unit.  
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 The Cartesian revolution brought a new dimension to many discussions including man’s 
place in nature and whether or not God was being eclipsed or replaced through the further 
development of tools, and technology:“If man is the centre of the revealed world, then his duty to 
fashion the world according to his own designs becomes obvious and indisputable.”35 Leibniz 
was not so keen on eliminating God from any discussion, and this particular self-inflation of the 
image of man didn’t sit right with him:  
“But in this manner he advanced in fact the very argument that renders the Christian faith 
unreal. For to a Christian the limits of man are drawn not by ‘the majesty of Nature’, but 
by God; it is in God that the Christian knows his foundations to lie, and in Him is man’s 
autonomy suspended. These limits of man the new mathematical thought was prepared to 
accept. But it interpreted them as drawn not by a divine, but by an anonymous power.”36 
 
Nature was just not allowed to be perceived as divine any more. Leibniz tried to protect and 
preserve Christian Cosmology in his essay “Systeme Nouveau de la Nature” but failed, as 
bringing the words “la majeste de la nature” no longer sufficed. As the natural world around us 
became more and more approachable through science and technology, Leibniz’s religion started 
taking blows to the gut. 
 In view of all of this tension, Leibniz attempted to take a few steps back and reintroduce 
God through the perspective of a Christian rationalist in his chef d’oeuvre the Monadology: “God 
alone is the primary Unity, or original simple substance, from which all monads, created and 
derived, are … born so to speak, by continuous fulgurations of the the Divinity…”37. The term 
he paraphrased as “original simple substance” is a very innovative thought, especially for a 
scientist who holds reason and rationalism above all. The sheer vagueness leaking out of every 
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cranny and crevasse doesn’t seem to stop Leibniz from believing in something that he could not 
sense or measure with any of his physical senses, which is as contradictory as it gets.  
Meyer captioned him as a Christian philosopher, a move not every Leibniz reader would 
do, as many have argued in favor of him being agnostic or atheistic, and not particularly religious 
even in his cultural identity. People have quoted his Sufficient Reason Principle, an argument 
which supports the questioning of even the simplest facts, and demands validation of all that is 
expected to be considered factual. Leibniz, as a rationalist, relied on reason and explanations. His 
prime argument had always been conditional to being able to comprehend or rationalize all, even 
if it meant that the matter at hand needed time and future technology required for its inevitable 
unveiling of its cause for creation or come to being out of its necessity. His Principles of 
Contradiction(which dictates that “a proposition cannot be true and false at the same time, and 
that therefore A is A and cannot be not A.”38) and Sufficient Reason does rely on a God, a creator 
that exists based off of its necessity in order for all to be defined within reason. Whether or not 
Leibniz used the word God in parallel with the world’s major religions is not very clear, and is 
still debated today. Interestingly both monotheistic religious people and atheists use his 
principals in arguments for and against, respectively, proof of the existence of a God. This comes 
to show how Leibniz’s arguments were open to many different and at times polar interpretations. 
It also underlines the inherent vagueness he leaves in his essays and books, which could arguable 
show signs of censorship of his time, especially when it came to religious discussion topics.  
 Leibniz’s contingency argument is another important one, in which he claims that the 
reason a God-like essence created the actual world is due to it being the best possible world there 
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could be:  “[t]he reason for this world is that it is the best[,] [t]he reason for any contingent truth 
is that, since the existence of the actual world entails it, it is for the best.”39 For a rationalist, 
there is no doubt that it is an extremely vague claim, but it sufficed for the time being, as I will 
further argue that he wasn’t truly in the business on solving theological problems per se, but 
rather intended for people to simply correct themselves. Leibniz wanted people to achieve public 
happiness for he believed it would reflect divine power and its perfections as his goals for 
humanity could only be achieved through God’s blessings(e.g., life, will, knowledge), which will 
be discussed in chapter 3. 
The simplest and uncontested thought Leibniz did possess was that he really did want 
peace amongst his fellow European men: “[w]hatever is publicly useful, is to be done[,] [t]he 
common good is valued by the goods of all being collected into one total.”40 Leibniz believed in 
creating higher structures, dependent on other independent structures, as mentioned in his 
Monadology, thereby his views on achieving public happiness must be incorporated into the 
foundations of his natural philosophy: “[g]ood is a necessity without which we are miserable, the 
rest are only called useful... [m]oreover, [people] will not think vicious thoughts, nor will them, 
nor be able to put them into practice.”41 He wanted his subjects to be good citizens, respectful of 
one another, loving and kind, exemplary to what Jesus would have wanted them to behave. This 
is what Leibniz was truly after, he could quite arguably have cared less about foreign culture if 
he didn’t believe in his mission: salvaging European morals, at any cost. Even if it meant that he 
would have to turn towards other cultures to look for answers. I am not suggesting that he was 
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disinterested in globalism or that he wasn’t objectively interested in any culture he could learn 
from, but the bottom line for him was maintaining Europe’s legacy as well as its supremacy. 
Perkins argued that: “[t]he fact that cultural exchange is important primarily as a way to gain 
experiential truths and observations fuels Leibniz’s enthusiasm for China.”42 is very true, but 
incomplete. It was important in the context of rebuilding Europe. Perhaps if Christian Europeans 
weren’t so busy being hostile to one another, Leibniz would not have praised the Chinese ruler as 
openly as he did in his Novissima Sinica. Yet that wasn’t the case at all, visibly speaking, he was 
incredibly open-minded, for his time. And he did indeed praise another continent’s ruler, which 
was a very tricky move, especially for someone under the patronage of a German prince. 
The most recognizable display of Leibniz’ cultural tolerance and desire for creating a 
mutually beneficial environment in which both communities could merge and give birth to a 
reformed super-culture can be found here:  “we need the Chinese to send us Missionaries in 
turn, for us to learn the natural religion that we have almost lost.”43 His open call for a cultural 
ambassadorship promotes a very modern concept, one that wasn’t likely to circulate until very 
recently, as immigration and cultural tolerance laws, in Europe, didn’t relax until well after 
Leibniz’s era.  
When Leibniz eventually got his hands on more Chinese materials, thanks to the Jesuit 
missionaries, he found interest in one specific book titled I Ching, which can be translated as the 
Book of Changes. After a French Jesuit missionary, Joachim Bouvet, who was convinced that he 
saw a binary arithmetic in some of the diagrams he shared with Leibniz, the German thinker 
decided to write an essay about it and send it to the Academy of Sciences, in Paris, two years 
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after his exposure to this previously hidden arithmetic.44  The oldest edition of  I Ching dates 
back five millennia, and is still referred to as it is considered more simple and natural in its 
knowledge. Leibniz used the book in the creation of his new binary arithmetic that we still 
depend on quite heavily every day, as it makes up our computer processing instructions, used by 
most of the electronic devices around us. Interestingly, Perkins mentioned Leibniz’s noted 
disbelief of coming across any potential scientific revelation in Chinese ancient doctrine: 
“[w]hile Leibniz is anxious to learn many things from China, he generally does not expect to 
learn truths in such fields as mathematics or metaphysics.”45 The truth is that he eventually did 
learn more by reverting to much older texts, which perhaps sealed the envelope belonging to his 
Chinese-European conversion mission statement. After all, this ancient doctrine had given him 
his famous works on binary, one of which being  Explication de l'arithmétique binaire, qui se 
sert des seuls caracteres 0 & 1(Explanation of the binary arithmetic which utilizes only the 
numbers 0 &1), why couldn’t it give him the solution to Europe’s problems as well? If the I 
Ching managed to keep this mathematical secret for so long, what did other ancient Chinse texts 
have in store for the Europeans who had the capacity of uncovering more hidden meanings?  
Indeed, we could add that just as the I Ching suggested that increasingly complicated 
adumbrations of binaries could explain extremely complex fields, so the binary system – as 
modern computers demonstrated – could form a foundational language connecting each culture. 
In any case, this one insight was so powerful for Leibniz’ thought that it must have suggested the 
value of the mutual translation of the two systems. 
 Leibniz thought that bringing China systemic religion would improve the then modern 
Chinese philosophies as a whole, by providing them with the mostly verbal tools that would 
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get them out of their Stoic deadlock. According to Cook, the use of the word “ancient”, when 
describing the many philosophies of the Chinese people is more than crucial to the whole 
operation, as he didn’t credit the then modern thinkers to merit the titles of reasonable 
interpreters of the ancient texts (as he remarked in his Discourse on the Natural Theology of 
the Chinese). This is an important remark, showing how strictly Leibniz was editing what he 
presented in his interpretations and characterizations of Chinese theology. All of this brings us 
to an important question on why Leibniz privileged ‘ancient’ information, whether it was 
Western, Chinese or Middle Eastern. Did it have to do with a notion of what was written down 
by the ancients must have been simple, direct, and thus relatively more original in thought? 
Why did he edit out modern thoughts, what made modern thought so tainted, and if the modern 
thinkers were so off point, how could the Chinese people be converted given the reasoning that 
they would have been influenced by their modern thinkers and interpreters of their ancient 
texts? 
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Chapter 2 
Chinese Rites: heresy or exemplar?  
 
 
Leibniz’ understanding of China can be traced back to the the Jesuit order’s first 
Chinese mission, which commenced with St. Francis Xavier(1506-1566)’s attempt to travel to 
China in 1552. Although, his journey ended prematurely with his death, the desire to establish 
a Christian outpost was still there, and the fire was finally rekindled in 1582 with Matteo 
Ricci, when he successfully settled and established an outpost in mainland China, in which 
Jesuits could study the Chinese ways and start converting locals. The Jesuits had significant 
political influence, particularly when they served as advisors to the rulers who were tolerant 
and eager to learn about Western science and philosophy. Using the intelligence first provided 
by the Jesuits, Leibniz suggested in his writings on China, spanning from 1699 to 1716, that 
there was serious merit to the notion of a transmission and dialogue between the Chinese and 
Christian spheres. To understand the merits and flaws of Leibniz’ argument, as well as its 
ambitious scope, we need to first situate it in the controversies that developed around Jesuit 
missions to China. In particular, in the “Chinese Rites Controversy” Leibniz would strongly 
side with those who saw Chinese beliefs as harmonizing with those Christianity, and against 
those who considered them antithetical. It was from this base that Leibniz could build the 
project of the mutual translation of the two cultures.  
Leibniz wrote philosophical texts primarily expanding on notes and critiques 
belonging to a Father Longobardi. He was convinced that the priest was being objective, and 
not flattering of classical Chinese authors and their works. Longobardi was a Jesuit 
missionary who had been stationed in China by his order with the aims of translating and 
understanding Chinese doctrines, along with converting the public. Leibniz’s didn’t shy away 
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from critiquing Longobardi’s interpretation of certain Chinese doctrines. For example, the 
embodiment of angels, Leibniz writes, was not a sign of the denial of an existence of the 
spiritual, as Longobardi had argued: many of Europe’s well-respected philosophical 
forefathers had made the same presumptuous mistake on the case of the angels. As with many 
areas of his interpretation, Leibniz’ own philosophy attempted to make immanent and material 
aspect of Christianity that were transcendent. He found in Chinese philosophy a ready set of 
parallels. He wasn’t concerned with disallowing foreign concepts and understandings of 
prestige, and to grant them high acclamation if and when they were deserving of such a thing: 
“there is in China a public morality admirable in certain regards, conjoined to a philosophical 
doctrine, or rather a natural theology, venerable by its antiquity, established and authorized for 
about 3,000 years, long before the philosophy of the Greeks whose works nevertheless are the 
earliest which the rest of the world possess, except of course for our Sacred Writings.”46. Yet 
he couldn’t refrain from using some sort of monotheistic reference, even if it meant the 
mentioning of the Old Testament, this might be an indication of editorial censoring, or it very 
well might have been an original remark, there is no way of knowing. 
 Accommodating Chinese ideas, not viewing them as completely irrelevant to 
Christianity was  a view popularized by Ricci, and followed by Leibniz. Leibniz wasn’t alive 
when Ricci convinced Europe, for a brief period, that Chinese ancient texts could be 
interpreted in certain lights that would make it accessible for Christians to relate to this 
entirely foreign and secluded society’s older beliefs. Matteo Ricci was an incredibly important 
person for Leibniz, this Italian born Jesuit spent most of his adult life in China, learning from 
the locals, the Chinese court, and both their modern and ancient doctrines. If we were to 
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remember this man by one idea, it would be his accommodationist view when it came to 
understanding and accepting ancient Chinese natural philosophy. Ricci’s successor Father 
Longobardi, opposed this idea of trying to hold some Chinese concepts of heaven and a 
supreme ancestor, outdating Jesus and his friends, in which Ricci pointed out alleged 
similarities between Chinese philosophy with Christian theology. He intended for these 
similar terms to work as a bridge between the two immensely different cultures, and the 
stories of their origins. Ricci, and in time Leibniz, fought for China’s right to be able to be 
considered salvageable, or religiously redeemable, as they believed that cultural differences 
shouldn’t act as permanent roadblocks, crippling an entire nation and stopping them from 
become Christians.  
Ricci, became remarkably comfortable with Chinese culture and language in a relatively 
short slice of time. He comprehended the importance of learning about his immediate 
community, in which he was given the mission to uncover Chinese practices as well as to 
convert as many people as he could. His firm grasp on the language made ideas all the more 
accessible to him, it is noted that his Chinese writing skills were virtually indistinguishable 
with his contemporary Chinese scholars. His open mindedness and, most importantly, his 
willingness to accommodate potentially parallel foreign constructs into Christian traditions of 
thinking was what truly attracted Leibniz to his work. Ricci, did not look down upon the 
cultures of the settlements he visited, and when in China went as far as to “shave[] [his] head 
and beard, shroud[] in the robes of a Buddhist monk” , he stated that the reason why he 
changed his entire European look, was because he believed that religious men in China needed 
to dress holy, and had to forfeit luxury in many ways. Interestingly, he later understood how 
he had been cultivating his image in a wrong way, that the Buddhist monks were lower class, 
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and that to gain influence he needed silks. Moreover, Buddhism was in part a heterodox sect, 
whereas the Confucianism of the court would allow him greater access. Dressing like the 
Chinese literati instead of like a reminder of how “the name of foreigners and priests is 
considered so vile in China that we need this and other similar devices to show them that we 
are not priests as vile as their own.”47 
Ricci, as well as every other missionary at the time witnessed the different actions and 
reactions regarding law and its enforcement, and felt as if corrections were to be made 
specifically for their target audience: the Chinese public. An example that encapsules this claim 
perfectly is Ricci and his colleague Ruggieiri’s translation of “Thou shall not committ adultery” 
to “Thou shalt not do depraved, unnatural or filthy things.”48 As vague as the statement was, they 
altered this widespread translation for it to be comparatively louder and clearer than the original 
one given the different audience. They expected the public to understand and change their ways 
regarding their crimes and punishments, with the aid of this more comprehensive translation. 
This is a very important example, showing how like minded Leibniz and Ricci were when it 
came to cultural appropriation and trying to maintain, what they thought, was universal equality 
but was in fact an attempt at elevating quality of life to Eurocentric standards. 
 Contrary to Ricci and Leibniz’s enthusiasm, Longobardi along with most Dominican 
and Franciscan Friars of the time did not adapt Chinese philosophy to Christian theology, as 
they believed that making such connections were simply wrong. This debate between these two 
sides, battling over whether or not mostly Confucian doctrine was compatible with Christianity 
is known as the Rites Controversy. Ricci’s fluid definitions, and willingness to appropriate 
Chinese natural philosophy with European monotheistic theology was eventually overlooked, 
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and overturned. Yet, Leibniz wasn’t convinced that throwing it all away was appropriate, and 
he argued in favor of Chinese culture, in order to establish their closeness to European 
standards of spirituality. His goal in doing so, was to groom their image as wise and ethical 
people that were chiefly misguided due to a lack of centralized religion and European 
knowledge: perfect candidates for a conversion.  
Leibniz wasn’t intimidated by this vastly different culture: to him the Chinese 
civilization was one that would eventually validate humanity’s magnetic attraction to reason 
and wisdom. After all, logic had to be in the foundations of all principles, regardless of the 
geography of their origins. The true optimist, he was compelled to look at China as a potential 
land of radically different but compatible ideas, with philosophies that could aid Christianity 
and what it had become. The Chinese conversion to Christianity would trigger a mutually 
beneficial reform period, mending the hostility that had been lingering around Europe for far 
too long. As a principle commentator on this period this aspect of Leibniz’ work, Franklin 
Perkins notes: “While Europe’s moral poverty led it to perpetual conflicts and wars between 
religious factions, (in Leibniz’s lifetime) China was peaceful. This led Leibniz to prefer the 
natural theology of the Chinese to the corrupted revealed theology of Europe”49. 
This potential challenge of cultural translation, as he imagined, would yield a greater 
perspective on to God, and to Leibniz that was the most fundamental outcome of the project. 
On one hand he was stating that it was a conversion, a task which God expected from all good 
Christians, on the other it was a journey that would reverse the sails, and return Christians to 
the core of the religion, before it was corrupted by humans. The same humans which were 
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capable of impurities due to lack of knowledge and wrongful executions deriving from wrong 
thoughts and free will, who could partake in the very same mistakes regardless of their 
placement in the physical world, and so he believed in his cause: “And thus, as far as I 
understand, I think the substance of the ancient theology of the Chinese is intact and, purged 
of additional errors, can be harnessed to the great truths of the Christian religion.”50 This idea 
will be revisited in the following chapter.  
In order to be able to pave the road to discuss the Chinese conversion, Leibniz found 
that he had to first convince Europe of how the Chinese weren’t too far off the path of 
religion, and he could only achieve this through Ricci’s accommodationist foundations.  His 
primary task was to fit Chinese thoughts into his conceptions of Western theology and 
philosophy. As he tried to carry out this task, he was quite aware of his process of breaking 
down these foreign views and translating them with care. He takes this association between 
the two completely different philosophical realms to the next level when he brings in his 
Monadaology, which I will comment on after establishing his respect for Chinese doctrine on 
a more broad spectrum. Leibniz, in his Remarks on Chinese Rites and Religion:  
“What the ancient priests and philosophers of China thought is not easy to determine. 
Even with so much illumination from history, criticism and philosophy, we know how 
often we argue among ourselves about the meaning of Plato, Aristotle and even 
Augustine. Among the Chinese, I believe neither history nor criticism nor philosophy 
are sufficiently developed. No one at all has yet emerged who has produced a literary 
history of the Chinese and who has attributed the true works, meanings and sense to 
each author.”51.  
In other words, he had objections to how Chinese thought was being misinterpreted in its own 
culture, as there was a certain lack of context. He thought his philosophy could make amends 
for this, and provide a broader context for ancient Chinese thought. 
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Leibniz tried to bring in examples of Chinese rituals that would work as common 
ground, in order to make this foreign culture more approachable and inherently relatable. He 
gave an example on the afterlife which one could view as an attempt at connecting between 
Christian and Pagan European customs: “one could demonstrate that the literati thought that 
the souls of Confucius and the others were conscious of what is happening after death and that 
they reward those who imitate and worship them and punish those who scorn them.”52. This 
could be used to support his argument claiming the Chinese public to be one of spiritual belief 
infusions, allowing them a sort of access to the Christian realm. 
What was most important to Leibniz in his Remarks on Chinese Rites and Religion, is 
his eagerness to save and preserve Chinese souls, as he continuously tries to bring perspective 
to their lack of religion, or specifically, lack of centralized and harmonious religion. In his 
view, the basis of such a religion already existed in ancient China, but had been lost by a lack 
of systematic criticism and organization: 
“I would think that no doubt many philosophers from the Orient, no less than the 
Platonists and Stoics, regarded God as the World-soul or as the universal nature 
immanent in things; that other spirits also assumed bodies; and that some even 
considered the soul as a particle of the divine aura, which would return to the Ocean of 
souls with the body's death. I would not deny that this had been the thought of many 
Chinese philosophers, but since the philosophy of the Chinese has never been 
organized in a systematic form, and, I very much suspect, they lack philosophical 
terminology, nothing prevents interpreting what the ancients teach about divine and 
spiritual things in a more favorable sense.”53 
 
 Leibniz, in the first part of his Discourse on the Natural Theology of the Chinese, pointed out 
that he believes that the Chinese have recognized “spiritual substances”, yet the parameters of 
its metaphysical identity is left unclear: “ I believe that they did, although perhaps they did not 
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recognize these substances as separated, and existing quite apart from matter. There would be 
no harm in that with regard to created Spirits, because I myself am inclined to believe that 
Angels have bodies; which has also been the opinion of several ancient Church Fathers. I am 
also of the opinion that the rational soul is never entirely stripped of all matter.”54. He then 
explained how the Chinese thought God was embodied, and that the only way for them to 
understand European Christianity was through their comprehension of how God was an 
intelligentia supramundana([notion]beyond understanding), and superior to matter. In order 
for Leibniz to be able to further argue the benefits of adding Chinese ethics and philosophies, 
as a whole, into European culture, he needed to convince his readers that the Chinese had to be 
credited with advanced natural theological theories: “Therefore, in order to determine whether 
the Chinese recognize spiritual substances, one should above all consider their Li, or order, 
which is the prime mover and ground of all other things, and which I believe corresponds to 
our Divinity.”55, and he thus cut the ribbon and began his excavation of li. 
Father Longobardi spent a lot of time gathering materials on li, the first principle, “They 
call it (par excellence) the Being, the Substance, the Entity. According to them, this substance is 
infinite, eternal, uncreated, incorruptible, and without beginning or end” these qualities of li 
create a divide between itself and Monads, as Monads cannot ignore time, and require explicit 
creation. Leibniz writes (it seems that this Father L but then next sentence makes it seem like 
Leibniz):“It is not only the principle of the physical basis of Heaven and Earth and other 
material things, but also the principle of the moral basis of virtues, customs, and other spiritual 
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things. It is invisible, it is perfect in its being to the highest degree, and it is itself all 
perfections.”56 
Leibniz expanded on the concept of li two years after he finished his Monadology, 
which must be associated to his deeper understanding and the meanings he projected on to li 
regardless of what li really was. The Monadology seems to appear highly influential on 
Leibniz’s perception of unique, fluid, immaterial building blocks he captioned as Monads.  Li, 
in other words, was the Chinese inferior product to his rationalist European constructs, and 
can only be properly compared to the Stoic’s natural theology, as it is described to be morally 
grounded and still trapped in the material world, quite like a Greek God; li should be regarded 
as a simple deity or theology that must be improved or converted. 
Father Longobardi tried to further disassociate, or quite arguably discredit, this 
foreign concept in order to affirm European theology’s superiority and to make sure that 
people didn’t mistake li for God: “do not let yourself be dazzled by these specious names 
under which a poisonous doctrine is hidden. For if you penetrate to the very heart of the 
matter, to its very root, you will see that this Li is nothing other than our prime 
Matter57.”.Here he brings in prime matter, a matter which is given the properties of gas, 
Longobardi tried to direct people’s attention towards the spiritual and material 
understandings of creation and existence, in an arguably aggressive fashion. After all, his 
                                               
56  Leibniz, “Discourse on the Natural Theology of the Chinese,”1716. As Cited in Cook, Writings on 
China, 80. 
57 Ibid., 83. 
Note 27:“prime matter is purely passive, capable only of receiving motions or shapes from an 
active power and is hence incapable of the active powers ascribed to the Li. Without being 
informed with a soul or entelechy or some sort of power of activity, matter is never a genuine or 
complete substance according to Leibniz and can be known only in abstraction from it.” Ibid.,84, 
 
35 
 
desire to maintain, if not augment the value of the gospel of the lord was his primary 
mission, as he was stationed in China as a Jesuit missionary. 
The following sections of Leibniz’s Discourse on the Natural Theology of the Chinese 
points out Longobardi’s prejudice; they state that the Sicilian priest had been influenced by 
certain Mandarin Atheists, and their views that use the ancient texts in a manipulative way. He 
suggests then that Longobardi was reading arguments that were written to promote flaws in 
the ancient natural religion: “One should no more trust the obviously strained interpretation of 
such people than one would trust those of an Atheist in Europe who would try to demonstrate 
by passages pulled out of context, from Solomon and other holy authors, that there is no 
reward or punishment beyond this life”58 and so his bibliography was heavily edited. He 
strengthens his argument with a very bold example: “And if by misfortune Atheism should 
prevail in Europe and become the doctrine of the most learned•• as there was a time when 
Averroism almost prevailed among the philosophers of Italy ••then if missionaries were sent 
to Europe by the 60 sages of China and they studied our ancient books, they would have 
reason to oppose the wave of opinion of these most learned men and to ridicule their 
ridicule.”59. Leibniz here makes it evident that in order for the cultural reciprocity to trigger a 
conversion and advancement as society as he knew it, his readers needed to clearly see how 
cultures are incredibly open to misinterpretation through being introduced to partial, 
prejudicial and/or tainted analysis. Ultimately, Leibniz discredited Longobardi’s attempt at 
tying li to the Scholastic’s prime matter, substantial underlying reality of all things, ill fitting. 
Consequently Li, should be translated as order and reason. 
                                               
58 Ibid., 84 
59 Ibid. 
36 
 
Why was Leibniz trying so hard to redesign Christian morals? Why did he care? Was 
he doing it all for himself? Cook suggests that Leibniz is aiming to revert back to some 
previous version of Christianity: 
“He surely cannot mean that Europeans have lost the ability to prove that God exists 
or that the soul is immortal; he believed he had himself given a stronger footing than 
ever. In saying that natural religion is almost lost, Leibniz must mean something else, 
that natural theology has lost the attention of the Europeans, who concentrate instead 
on the distractions of sectarian debate. These conflicts and distractions keep our 
innate ideas out of our apperception. So Leibniz does not expect the Chinese to teach 
Europeans how to reason better or to give them new proofs for the existence of God; 
rather, the Chinese would help purify religious discourse in Europe by emphasizing 
its essential core.”  
Reverting back to previous natural theologies, and not attempting to rationalize and 
reformulate what was at hand, and consequently formulating a ‘pure religious discourse’ 
would’ve been the obvious plan for a thinker such as Leibniz, unlike what Cook suggests. He 
did indeed expect the Chinese to rationalize religion: “One sends some Missionaries all the 
way to China to preach the Christian religion, and does good, but we need some Missionaries 
of Reason in Europe, to preach the Natural Religion, on which Revelation itself is founded, and 
without which Revelation would always be taken poorly. The Religion of Reason is eternal, 
and God has engraved it in our hearts, our corruptions have obscured it, and the end of Jesus-
Christ has been to render its luster, to restore men to the true knowledge of God and of the 
soul, and to make them practice the virtue 
makes the true good.”60 
Leibniz authored The Monadology, late in his life in 1714, as a summary of his 
philosophy. Through this text we can also see why the Chinese understanding of Li and of 
natural theology would be entirely coherent to Leibniz, and why in turn his philosophy would 
provide a new materialist base for it. In the Monadology, he described incorporeal entities that 
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he called Monads. He introduced them as substantial and temporal forms of being, of varying 
levels of apperception. Unlike the atoms of Democritus61, Monads are not material things, but 
rather principles of change that combine to create different ensembles: a table is a collection of 
animate Monads for Leibniz, as is a dog or an institution such as the Catholic Church. The 
combination of Monads – which Leibniz came to understand using the principle of calculus he 
invented – described functional relations of change that defined and created different forms of 
time and space. They are “elements of things”62, he wrote, that “can come into being only by 
creation and come to an end only by annihilation”63, and are immune to external changes: 
“natural changes of the Monads come from an internal principle,”64. Yet Leibniz held that the 
interrelation of all Monads was first established by God’s pre-established harmony. Most 
notably, they are all strictly unique: “each Monad must be different from every other. For in 
nature there are never two beings which are perfectly alike”65 . 
He underlined its resemblance to the concept of the soul, “If we are to give the name 
of Soul to everything which has perceptions and desires (...) then all simple substances or 
created Monads might be called souls”66  but he clearly states that “the soul is something more 
than a bare Monad.”67. He differentiates the two by stating that souls are tied to memory, and 
thereby cannot exist without consciousness (both animal and human).  For him, Monads are a 
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lot more complicated and immaterial notions that have three stages, each stage gradually 
getting closer to perfection. It is also important to remark that these Monads “express the 
whole universe”68, much as a anamorphic mirror (like a mirrored ball) reflects a room. They 
are moreover infinitely dense: “Each portion of matter may be conceived as like a garden full 
of plants and like a pond full of fishes. But each branch of every plant, each member of every 
animal, each drop of its liquid parts is also some such garden or pond”69 They are “always in a 
perpetual flux like rivers”70 and are thus able to be involved in multiple Monadic constructs, 
whilst remaining in a unique state within its own boundaries. These metaphysical, incorporeal 
structures aided him in getting a grasp of the natural world, and beyond, and allowed for a 
new science based on change, forces, and relations rather than static elements in mechanical 
relation. 
Monadic constructions significantly drove him to make sense of the complexity which 
was the Chinese natural philosophy, and arguably their natural theology. The whole universe 
was a monadic construction, and at its core was God as the monad-in-chief. But this God was 
also a living reflection of this ensemble: it was, from one perspective, li. Once Leibniz saw the 
words li and qi(or ki), his interest in the matters of Chinese theology peaked as they appeared 
to him to be harmonious with Monadic thought and an essence that complicated 
conceptualizing all Chinese thought as atheistic. So his quest to promote the Chinese people as 
a group which could possibly be proven spiritually worthy enough to be converted to 
Christianity commenced – a translation and conversion which would, of course, substantially 
endorse the value of his novel philosophy. 
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It can be argued that the best pairings are made possible by a selecting candidates based 
on the polarity of each other's respective strengths. Leibniz would’ve been a firm believer of this 
argument, given that his conviction that the Euro-Chinese alliance would prove to be an 
excellent idea rested on the differences of the two very large powers: “[n]ow the Chinese 
Empire, which challenges Europe in cultivated area and certainly surpasses her in population, 
vies with us in many other ways in almost equal combat, so that now they win, now we”. 
Through divine harmony, the two systems had developed separate and roughly equivalent views 
of the universe; it was to Leibniz’ age now possible to bring them into dialog to create a new 
definition of a monotheistic natural theology. This was very convenient for Leibniz, as this is the 
foundation of the whole project. If China had been more advanced than Europe, even the fact 
that they were so spread out from each other wouldn’t have saved them from a possible 
triggering of some sort of physical or intellectual war. And if the Europeans were too advanced 
for this alliance to take place, they would have just attempted to colonize areas they deemed 
prosperous.  
It is important to note that while Leibniz is praising their reasoning of  “despis[ing] 
everything which creates or nourishes ferocity in men,” which he provides as background to the 
lack of European militaristic technology and sophistication, he remarked that “[t]hey would be 
wise indeed if they were alone in the world[,] [b]ut as things are, it comes back to this, that even 
the good much cultivate the arts of war, so that the evil may not gain power over everything.”71 
Leibniz does not suggest demilitarizing Europe, or trying to somehow halt European aggression 
and hostility, but he does greatly admire Chinese civil behaviour. I am not quite sure he 
completely understood his beloved Ricci’s observations on the harshness of Chinese 
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punishments and the very strict law enforcement across its many territories, that he wrote down 
in his journals, yet he praises them quite freely, time and again: “ Indeed, it is difficult to 
describe how beautifully all the laws of the Chinese, in contrast to those of other peoples, are 
directed to the achievement of public tranquility and the establishment of social order, so that 
men shall be disrupted in their relations as little as possible[;] [c]ertainly by their own doing men 
suffer the greatest evils and in turn inflict them upon each other.”72 It is unclear whether or not 
Leibniz expected European governments to claim all authority regarding the enforcement of civil 
law in public. Thinking of the Chinese maintaining of public lawfulness, it must be said that the 
self-proclaimed problem solver Leibniz left a few crucial subjects up in the air.  
If the Chinese weren’t religious and expected government officials to maintain highly 
ethical behaviour in public, and this system was to be practiced in Europe, how would this affect 
the Church’s standing and authority? Surely, the ethical pillars or crutches that were the reason 
why Western Civilization was still standing would take a massive blow if Chinese ways of 
preserving moral standards were to migrate to Europe. The most important question here is: 
would this, as a result, delegitimize Christianity’s, almost monopolized, authority on ethical 
standards? Where would it stand and how would these ideas be received? Leibniz unintentionally 
stated that Christianity can’t guide the public to be upstanding citizens and he aimed to bring 
back what ancient Chinese doctrine or what the friars would call atheism to Europe to save all of 
their souls? What about all of the different sects? Leibniz was raised as a Protestant, and was 
therefore conditioned to accept potential constructive amendments to be made on his religion. 
However, as the Catholics had never been as accepting, would Catholic Europe welcome a 
completely foreign culture into its midst, and let it dictate what changes must be made on their 
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faith? As Leibniz would agree, an outsider’s perspective and criticism can benefit the host 
society in many ways, from potential constructive alterations to gaining information on how the 
host society is perceived by the outside world. On the other hand, as most would agree, it is hard 
to take criticism in the first place: even if all of Europe was made up of reformist Protestants, it 
would’ve been highly unlikely for people to just let go of the system they were born into, 
especially if this renovation wasn’t being carried out by the public in a bottom-up revolutionary 
fashion.  Yet if the value of Chinese natural theology could be demonstrated it might form a 
common foundation for the various Christian confessions – much as Leibniz had hoped his own 
philosophy could, but now through the revealed wisdom of one of God’s creations: China. 
 Leibniz was working as an intellectual, trying to solve Europe’s morality crisis. As crime 
and quotidian hostility was seemingly too high for Leibniz’s liking, he started searching high and 
low for a way to save his beloved continent from unethical behavior, and most importantly: from 
the very distracting sect rivalries. From the texts he was exposed to thanks to his correspondents, 
he managed to envision what he truly wanted for his friends, neighbors, fellow countrymen, and 
his beloved Europeans: “[s]o great is obedience toward superiors and reverence toward elders, so 
religious, almost, is the relation of children toward parents, that for children to contrive anything 
violent against their parents, even by word, is almost unheard of.”73 The way Leibniz thought he 
could best bring in this Chinese public peace, was through Christianity. Though his writings 
suggest that he was religious, and he thought that this whole project would deepen his 
understanding of God and natural theology, it is clear that his primary motive was to simply end 
religious hostility. The most valuable end product belonging to this plan would’ve been the 
reformed Euro-Chinese form of Christianity. It had the potential of halting all that was 
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distracting Europe from achieving greatness and becoming a true civilization: a most advanced 
and complex society.  
 Leibniz knew how important it was for the Chinese court to access European advanced 
sciences and other teachings. However, Leibniz was not running a charity. He had a very clear 
goal for which he would never compromise, and so he thought that he could reach his objective 
at the cost of trading European intellectual commodities:  
“[M]athematicians from the Academie des Sciences have been sent to the Orient to teach 
the monarch, not only the mathematical arts, but also the essence of our philosophy [...] 
But it is desirable that they in turn teach us those things which are especially in our 
interest: the greatest use of practical philosophy and a more perfect manner of living, to 
say nothing now of their other arts. Certainly the condition of our affairs, slipping as we 
are into ever greater corruption, seems to be such that we need missionaries from the 
Chinese who might teach us the use and practice of natural religion, just as we have sent 
them teachers of revealed theology.”74 
This passage reveals two important parts of his plan, the first being the reciprocity of knowledge 
exchange expected from the Chinese, in view of their dominance over Europeans in the realm of 
practical philosophies and social morality, and the second being the call for missionaries from 
China to travel to Europe with the hopes of them teaching Europeans how to apply natural 
theology to their lives. The latter is a great act of submission, as Europeans were the original 
missionaries, they were mostly Christian learned men travelling abroad to enlighten the world. 
Now with this cultural exchange program, they were supposed to find themselves in requirement 
of and hospitably accept foreign missionaries to teach them what had been a known challenge for 
the continent, for centuries. This change of tide in the exchange of necessary information that 
one nation possessed and the other did not, could have acted as a threat to the faith Europeans 
had in their self-declared supremacy over the rest of the world. 
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 Even if religious hostility and ethical problems were suffocating the people from within 
the borders of the Western world, for Leibniz, Europe’s gift of Christianity was able to redeem 
the continents name and restore its prestige : “And so I believe that if someone expert, not in the 
beauty of goddesses but in the excellence of peoples, were selected as judge, the golden apple 
would be awarded to the Chinese unless we should win by virtue of one great but superhuman 
thing, namely, the divine gift of the Christian religion.”75 This was Leibniz’s way to show his 
readers however dire the morality issues might have been, Europe could always surpass China, 
as long as it held on to its faith, Christianity. Yet, if China were to accept Christianity and 
embrace it the way Europe eventually did, could Europe still contest for the golden apple? 
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Chapter 3 
Leibniz’s City of God 
 
 
For Leibniz, as we have seen, Chinese doctrine was far too important and underutilized to 
be considered a heresy that was to be discarded of or burnt away. China existed for a greater 
reason: God had made China and its teachings accessible to Leibniz in order for him to get the 
chance to fulfill his foundational goal of reaching the closest degree perfection man was 
permitted access to. China permitted Leibniz to observe a state where natural theology is the 
most dominant philosophical system. China and its naturally revealed religion, therefore, had an 
important place, as it played the role of a necessary counterpart to Europe.  
The basis of Leibniz’ higher order synthesis merged Europe’s monotheism and advanced 
analytical skill with China’s naturally revealed theology, a phenomenon which was inspired by 
the functions of Leibniz’s Monadology, for if simple substances could formulate compounds in 
order to fulfill the calling or requirement of a higher purpose or meaning, these material states 
could formulate a compound themselves. Molding such a complex structure wouldn’t take away 
from the essential independence the founding Monads or states possessed in their respective 
cores, but it would correct the underutilization or inefficiency of the subjects. This way, Leibniz 
properly allocated the perfect strengths and skills of the individual Monad or society, and 
proposed a complex but refined and tailored end product. God is defined by Leibniz as the 
perspective on all monadic combinations and defines a great civilization as similarly providing 
an overview of a vast, but lesser, realm of these combinations, perhaps as embodied by an 
emperor but also as an ideal construct as “the empire.” Two combine the perspectives of the two 
greatest known civilizations in the world would for Leibniz necessarily be both a political and 
theological event of the immense magnitude.  
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Leibniz trusted the ancient philosophies and the alleged natural theologies of the Chinese 
and considered them closer to the foundation of Chinese thought and far superior to their modern 
thinkers: “[n]ow this shows also that the ancient Chinese have surpassed the modern ones in the 
extreme, not only in piety (which is the basis of the most perfect morality) but in science as 
well.”76 The accommodationists’ interpretations of the ancient texts, free from associations with 
Buddhist, Taoist and atheistic concepts allowed Leibniz and other accommodationists to view 
them as belonging to the realm of natural theology. This is highlighted in the passages where 
Leibniz criticized Father Longobardi for being too dependent on the interpretations and 
commentary of Mandarin atheistic thinkers, for Leibniz this made Longobardi’s source for 
information quite tainted, and thereby his ideas on Chinese philosophy equally unreliable.77  
 One of the prime examples that worked in favor of Leibniz’s assumed superiority of 
European analytics and its products is of the Binary Arithmetic: 
 “Reverend Father Bouvet and I have discovered the meaning, apparently truest to the 
text, of the characters of Fohi, founder of Empire, which consist simply of combinations 
of unbroken and broken lines, and which pass for the most ancient writing of China in its 
simplest form. … Actually, the 64 figures represent a Binary Arithmetic which 
apparently this great legislator [Fu Xi] possessed, and which I have rediscovered some 
thousands of years later.”78 
Leibniz, today, is known to be the father of the Binary code, mentioned in Chapter 1 in the 
context of Leibniz’s use of the book of I Ching. Here in this passage he defends Chinese thought, 
to the extent of the simple but effective arithmetic that was, according to him misinterpreted for 
quite some time. Leibniz argued that before his European perspective landed on the books, many 
thinkers tried to apply different uses for the teachings, “Fohi, the Emperor Ven Vam and his son 
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Cheu Cum, and Confucius more than five centuries later, have all sought therein philosophical 
mysteries.”79 Yet, none of them saw the most suitable application of the arithmetic, but Leibniz 
and Father Bouvet, a French Jesuit missionary who spent time in China, did. This is an import 
remark, considering that it added to the case of the delegitimization of modern Chinese thought 
and the idea that these ancient Chinese books might have been hiding lucrative ideas that could 
only be mined using European tools.  
The religious situation in China, during Ricci’s time, was an interesting one, the 
increased commercialization and urbanization allowed for many religions to be practiced: 
synagogues, Taoist temples, Buddhist temples, Tibetan Buddhist temples, mosques welcomed its 
followers, this was made possible by the dominant state ideology, Confucianism, and its claim of 
superiority.80  
The reason why Matteo Ricci thought that the Chinese public’s ancient theologies could 
potentially welcome the guidance of an overarching religion, like Christianity, rested on how 
China carried itself all the way to his own century: 
“Of all the Pagan sects known to Europe, I know of no people who fell into fewer errors 
in the early ages of their antiquity than did the Chinese. From the very beginning of their 
history, it is recorded in their writings that they recognized and worshipped one Supreme 
Being whom they called the King of Heaven, or designated by some other name 
indicating his rule over heaven and earth.”81 
He was thoroughly impressed by the way Confucian principles had managed to guide most of the 
population without having a religious presence comparable to one derived from a monotheistic 
moral guidance system. Having no real claim on the events in the afterlife, convinced Ricci and 
other accommodationists that appropriating any anti-Christian themes to their ancient texts was 
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not respectful of their doctrines. Ricci not only established the Jesuit mission in China, but he 
also established the image of a religious European of an Abrahamic religion. Ricci’s respect for 
Chinese natural theology benefitted his image, and therefore his conversion mission. He tried to 
leave as much Chinese culture intact, in a similar way to how Pagan beliefs were once preserved 
in its followers great conversion to Christianity, some centuries ago.82 
Ricci noted that the Chinese were easy potential converts: “[they] could certainly become 
Christians, since the essence of their doctrine contains nothing the contrary to the essence of the 
Catholic faith nor would the Catholic faith hinder them in any way, but would indeed air in that 
attainment of the quiet and peace of the republic which their books claim as their goal.”83 Well 
then, why didn’t they convert to Christianity? Why did the mission fail? Ricci tried to maintain a 
high regard for himself and his cause where he was perceived as a foreigner selling religion 
where it wasn’t needed. From changing his attire to his class, to making the effort of becoming 
more than fluent in the Chinese language, he battled long and hard in order to preserve Chinese 
cultural identity and its almost sacred doctrines whilst promoting the true word of the lord. This 
wasn’t what all missionaries did, especially since the mission eventually was terminated due to 
the Rites controversy, and the hostility that arose out of the situation. 
Confucian doctrine was widespread and its concepts were made accessible to the public, 
however Leibniz suggested that there was more to be understood from the teachings. Leibniz 
claimed that Chinese thought far exceeded the depth of much European thought, and if this were 
true for modern thought it was even truer of ancient thought. Therefore the European analytical 
                                               
82 Perkins, Leibniz and China: A Commerce of Light. 27. 
83 Pasquale M. D'Elia, Matteo Ricci. Fonti Ricciane; Documenti Originali Concernenti Matteo Ricci E La 
Storia Delle Prime Relazioni Tra L'Europa E La Cina (1579-1615). (Roma: Libreria Dello Stato, 1942.) 
Vol.1, 20,39-40, 118-119. As cited in Jonathan D. Spence, The Memory Palace of Matteo Ricci.( New 
York, NY: Viking Penguin, 1984.) 210. 
48 
 
method of critical reading was needed in order for these texts’ true meanings to be revealed 
properly: 
“It is indeed apparent that if we Europeans were well enough informed concerning 
Chinese Literature, then, with the aid of logic, critical thinking, mathematics and our 
manner of expressing thought more exacting than theirs--we could uncover in the 
Chinese writings of the remotest antiquity many things unknown to modern Chinese and 
even to other commentators thought to be classical.”84 
This was argued in order to establish Longobardi’s failure to differentiate good sources for 
interpretations and information, as it so clearly suggests that European contemporary analytics 
were so superior to the Chinese’s that their modern writings couldn’t be trusted the same way as 
European documents. 
The relationship between Leibniz himself and God is itself an important one. Based off of 
his writings on religion and the Monadology, one would argue that he did believe in one all-
powerful God, and even went as far as to plot ways to strengthen his understanding of God 
through harmony and the graduation on to a higher level of society. Leibniz set out to 
accomplish this dream of further proving God’s existence through reverting to simpler and more 
natural theological concepts. Leibniz greatly admired the word simple, and the concept of going 
back to simplified versions of events or theories in order to rebuild the subject anew, in an 
attempt to avoid the problems that once caused impasses. This chapter will address Leibniz’s 
God, the relationship between God, li and Monads as well as Leibniz’s vision for the future and 
his underlying motivations that lead to his advocacy of the great Euro-Chinese exchange one last 
time before his death. Whereas we have address the basis in European problems for Leibniz’ 
quest, and the sources in Chinese thought from which he drew, this chapter will address his own 
experience and goals in the creation of his new hybrid kingdom of ideas. 
                                               
84 Leibniz, “Discourse on the Natural Theology of the Chinese,”1716. As Cited in Cook, Writings on 
China, 132-133. 
49 
 
 Leibniz wrote Pierre Bayle, author of the great 18th century Historical and Critical 
Dictionary, about his Monads and how he believed they made it possible to prove God, mainly 
through a plan which he later in the Monadology described as the City of God. Leibniz, like the 
Chinese did for Li, gave God attributes, or rather captioned his domains, with the hopes of being 
able to recreate God-like structures with a lot less perfections, which would still be considered 
large improvements on the then current ones. Leibniz thought he could only obtain this through 
the connections made through simple substances and the harmony that would come from the 
bonds. On one hand, he hoped to develop a new logic reaching the foundations of things, so that 
he developed various “universal characteristics” or languages through which to describe the 
world in the simplest terms. The most basic of these we have described earlier: a binary notation 
system. The most complicated was his invention of calculus. Yet on the other hand he proposed 
in his Theodicy that all monads form the “most perfect” possible combination, so that it was 
possible to always find an explanation for any state of affairs. It was this latter concept that 
Leibniz took as both a hypothesis about the world and one which, once entered, formed a new 
sort of proof for God:   
“Besides, no hypothesis but this (which I venture to call proved) fittingly exalts the 
greatness of God; and this Monsieur Bayle recognized when, in his Dictionary (article 
Rorarius), he raised objections to it, in which indeed he was inclined to think that I was 
attributing too much to God- more than it is possible to attribute. But he was unable to 
give any reason which could show the impossibility of this universal harmony, according 
to which every substance exactly expresses all others through the relations it has with 
them.”85  
Attributing too much to God, was for Leibniz the entire point of his theodicy: it was a belief that 
than revealed a proper approach to knowledge and belief.  
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Leibniz’s willingness not to give up on the Chinese case, even after the Vatican’s 
finalized decision regarding Chinese doctrine in the beginning of the eighteenth century shut off 
his conduit of information from the region, is probably largely due to the fact that Leibniz 
believed that God chose this very universe for it showed the greatest potential. This universe, to 
him, was worth working on because of the impossibility of God putting faith or effort into the 
wrong universe: “[n]ow, as in the Ideas of God there is an infinite number of possible universes, 
and as only one of them can be actual there must be a sufficient reason for the choice of God, 
which leads Him to decide upon one rather than another.”86 The reason he gives for this sounds 
quite logical for how absurd and abstract it really is:  “[a]nd this reason can be found only in the 
fitness, or in the degrees of perfection, that these worlds possess, since each possible thing has 
the right to aspire to existence in proportion to the amount of perfection it contains in germ.”87 
The idea of the fitness of the entire universe to be measured by the level of perfection found in a 
germ is certainly far out there, even by Leibniz’s standards, but it does grant him the permission 
to trust his God and fellow man in a very interesting manner. Leibniz’s God and his best universe 
scenario only works through an understanding of both parties appreciation for it being the best of 
circumstances, which is a very comforting thought for all involved parties. And on another note, 
this idea can be seen in everything Leibniz touches, as the efforts he makes, especially the ones 
underlining God’s virtue and creating better societies as he thought that improvements must be 
made in order for our world to reach the highest state and a new level of closeness to God. After 
all,   “the actual existence of the best that wisdom makes known to God is due to this, that His 
goodness makes Him choose it, and His power makes Him produce it”88 therefore it would be 
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more than wasteful to not try to complete God’s work and regroup on a religious path to the 
formation of great societies.  
 The degrees of perfection Leibniz mentions rest on God’s power, knowledge and will. 
This concept is difficult to grasp at first due to its oxymoronic wording, but it is primarily 
associated with his classification of Monads and therefore does not make bold claims regarding 
perfection and its inner variety in a literal manner. To understand Leibniz’ argument we have to 
digress slightly to define what he understands monads to be, and how he would understand their 
complex interrelations to define most things, ideas, activities, and institutions. On the simplest 
level, this focus on monads allows us to understand why Leibniz’ approach to Chinese belief 
would be so sympathetic. The fact that Monads were simple substances, thought up to be 
naturally indivisible make it possible for them to be independent:   
“[t]hese characteristics [(God’s power, will and knowledge)] correspond to what in the 
created Monads forms the ground of basis, to the faculty of Perception and to the faculty 
of Appetition. But in God these attributes are absolutely infinite or perfect; and in the 
created Monads … there are only imitations of these attributes, according to the degree of 
perfection of the Monad.”89  
Appetition and perception in the realm of Monads represent the shift from one perception to 
another caused by their internal principle and the passing condition which shows multiplicity in 
the simple substance, respectively.90 It is important to distinguish the Monads’ self-sufficiency 
which allow themselves to govern their internal activities. This will be the crucial point in 
understanding how the Monad’s compound complex structures in turn will exemplify how 
humans would ideally reorganize themselves, in order to reach a higher level of enlightenment. 
 It must be noted however, that as Monads are capable of limited self-governing, within 
the constraints of their internal principals, they are unable to influence the inner principles of one 
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another and thereby are dependent of compound structures, which are collections of simple 
substances. The relationship between Monads could have derived from human connections: “in 
simple substances the influence of one Monad upon another is only ideal, and it can have its 
effect only through the mediation of God, in so far as in the ideas of God any Monad rightly 
claims that God in regulating the others from the beginning of things, should have regard to it.”91 
Leibniz often seeked backing from elements he would gather from his relationship with God, in 
attempts to ground his thoughts, and have an established and constant reference point 
This simple reference and the improvements he makes on the initial idea highlights 
Leibniz’s eagerness to revert back to more natural, and less contemporary or, as he described 
them, “modern” thoughts which he considered tainted due to religious rivalry, overall distance 
from natural theology and other contemporary issues. In order to perform this task, Leibniz 
needed another dose of natural theology. What he eventually found in China permitted him to 
reassure God’s position in the world, especially as prime law-giver and utilizer. 
 Leibniz’s conviction was that this was the right universe to be chosen by God as it 
showed the most potential, and this fit with God’s master craftsmanship and choice of the best 
fitting laws. In a way, his Monadology worked as means to convince himself first and the world 
second, that unity through harmony was the key to figuring out what was truly best for humanity. 
Even as universal harmony was a hypothesis, it was one that revealed both God’s complexity and 
a means of investigating any problem for its next deeper level of meaning. Entering into this 
circle demonstrated the power of Leibniz’s real order, and he thought that the Chinese had 
become better at perceiving that order. It was his firm belief that if European and Christian 
traditions of thinking were to be applied to their doctrines, their work would become more 
meaningful and worthy of mass distribution, especially if used as a device to refresh the essence 
                                               
91 Leibniz, Monadology. As cited in Latta, 246. 
53 
 
of God’s words, and reform Christianity. This was his goal, and his foundation is this being the 
most perfect world, and thus worthy of collaborative efforts and constructive dialogue between 
two great realms, Christian European and Chinese.  
The Monads simplicity, essence to be without parts, should be considered a model for 
human mind and spirit. Leibniz chose time and again, to reintroduce the subject of his essays in 
simpler form, with the aims of clarifying the core of the problem he desired to address and solve. 
In a letter to Nicolas Malebranche, a French Oratory priest and a rational philosopher, 
Leibniz explained how he viewed God’s way of thinking and emphasized the importance of 
simplicity: “God makes the most things he can and what obliges him to seek simple laws is the 
need to find a place for as many things as can be put together; if he made use of other laws, it 
would be like trying to make a building with round stones, which make us lose more space than 
they occupy.”92 Leibniz viewed the great architect as an entity that would respect the simplest 
ways to create and design its products made possible by its elementary foundations. He had high 
regard for what he thought was simple in its nature.  
According to Leibniz there are important distinctions to be made between souls in 
Monads, and they must be explained before entering the realm of souls, Li and whether or not 
souls were indeed a part of ancient Chinese theology, from the perspective and context of 
European theology. Leibniz finalized his thoughts about his Monadic structures well after 
encountering Li and other Chinese philosophical concepts, thus making his formulations of the 
differences between (his interpretation of)Li, Monads and souls quite deliberate. Leibniz, in his 
Monadology, drew a clean border between Monads and souls: 
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“If we are to give the name of Soul to everything which has perceptions and appetites in 
the general sense which I have explained, then all simple substances or created Monads 
might be called souls; but as feeling is something more than a bare perception, I think it 
right that the general name of Monads...should suffice for simple substances which have 
perception only, and that the name of Souls should be given only to those in which 
perception is more distinct, and is accompanied by memory.”93  
For Leibniz, we can conclude that he considers memory to be a deciding factor when 
contemplating the level of consciousness for his subject. He attributes appetites and perceptions 
to souls as well, which derives from the assumption that soul possessors have a degree of self-
sufficiency.  
 Leibniz planned out the differences between souls and Monads quite well, as before the 
Monadology’s release, he had time to revise his framework and approach anew his innovative 
and complex subject. The details and parameters on memory and how it formulates the 
difference between souls and Monads lies here:  
“For we experience in ourselves a condition in which we remember nothing and have no 
distinguishable perception; as when we fall into a swoon or when we are overcome with a 
profound dreamless sleep. In this state the soul does not perceptibly differ from a bare Monad; 
but as this state is not lasting, and the soul comes out of it, the soul is something more than a bare 
Monad.”94  
It is unclear whether or not Leibniz would state the following openly, as an argument on 
its own, but it is clearly implied in the text above; souls are not simple substances. The fact that it 
could be composed of a Monad or more, due to his rule stating that a soul is more than a bare 
Monad, eliminates another possible way in which the two could have been equals: in their 
immaterial skeletal structure.  
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Monads are non-spatial quite like souls, therefore one must interpret the closeness 
between Monads as a closeness between the bodies of the corresponding Monads.95 This is an 
important distinction to make, in order to preserve the inner principle’s independence from 
external natural factors.  
Leibniz’s concept of a soul requires it to have parts which aren’t exclusive to the 
possessor of the soul, thereby there isn’t a portion that remains unique to the possessor: “all 
bodies are in a perpetual flux like rivers, and parts are entering into them and passing out of them 
continually.”96 This recycling of parts of the soul isn’t immune to death, “there never is absolute 
birth [generation] nor complete death, in the strict sense, consisting in the separation of the soul 
from the body [,] [w]hat we call births [generations] are developments and growths, while what 
we call deaths are envelopments and diminutions.”97  
The flow of the soul’s parts that re-enter the system after an individual’s death, to be 
redefined by its new possessor acts as a bridge between Leibniz’s philosophy and Chinese 
alleged ancient spirituality. In the Discourse, Leibniz puts his pen, and noodle, to work one last 
time for one last fight in his advocacy for Chinese natural theology to be accepted, and for their 
spirituality to be observed, at the very least: 
“His fifth objection [(Father Longobardi’s fifth objection as to why he argued li was 
simply formless prime matter of the Scholastics’)] is also based on a false or mistaken 
supposition: namely, that according to the Chinese all things of the world are necessarily 
material and that there is nothing truly spiritual…. But I believe (as I have already said) 
that the Chinese recognize no distinct immaterial substance other than the Li which has 
produced Matter. In this I believe they are correct and that the order of things brings it 
about that all individual Spirits are always united to bodies and that the soul, even after 
death, is never stripped of all organized matter or of all informed air.”98 
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This very clear statement shows Leibniz’s matured perception of Chinese philosophy, especially 
since he mentioned going through passages he found from Chinese classical authors. It is also 
made possible through the findings and notions he utilized for the Monadology. Prior to 
clarifying his simple substances in the 90 paragraphs of this book, he had mentioned spirituality 
in a less broad context in his previous correspondences, arguing in favor of the Chinese theology. 
The Monadology permitted him to see li in a different light, which is the main reason why it is 
such a dominant theme in the Discourse. One could possibly argue that had he started working 
on clarifying his Monads to his readers beforehand, and also had gathered more on Chinese 
theology earlier, he might have been able to reach a larger audience and perhaps saved Chinese 
souls and thereby their Rites.  
 Leibniz’s prime motivation in the quest of mending European ethics and reforming 
Christianity, in order to settle the current and prevent future sect disputes, was revolved around 
his “City of God”. This plan for an advanced civilization first emerged at the end of the 
Monadology, but it can be observed in his plans for his Euro-Chinese dream. As it stands as the 
model for the ideal realm in which peace and piety come together to host a serene and virtuous 
environment that as a result reflects the might of God. Leibniz was certain that such a high 
achievement would prove the existence of God, as it could only be made possible through God 
as a creator and an architect, and that religion was the key that opened the door to mundane 
theological paradise. 
 Leibniz thought that a person’s will is given by the creator of all, his God, and that God 
itself possessed a secret will which lead many wise and virtuous people to sync with it and 
devote their energies to the cause. He believed that only by God’s pure love could people 
recognize the order of the universe and through God, find happiness: 
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 “Finally, under this perfect government no good action would be unrewarded and no bad 
one unpunished, and all should issue in the well-being of the good, that is to say, of those 
who are not malcontents in this great state, but who trust in Providence, after having done 
their duty, and who love and imitate, as is meet, the Author of all good, finding pleasure 
in the contemplation of His perfections, as is the way of genuine ‘pure love,’ which takes 
pleasure in the happiness of the beloved.”99 
The City of God would function as a tool to get closer to the only thing which does not possess a 
body, by his definition: God.  The passion he had for fighting for Chinese natural theology was 
fueled by the idea that it was possible to architect and engineer this city. For he genuinely 
believed that ancient and simple examples could add so much more to the divine debates. 
Leibniz also implied, in this passage, that the city could function properly only if governed by 
Providence, which would eventually have led people to find happiness and pure love, through 
religion. 
He figured that if people could read these millennia old texts, they could deduce that 
God, in Leibniz’ definition, was observed and noted in a land where Jesus could not have 
traversed and see, for themselves, how even these people so far from Christianity knew the 
power, knowledge, and grace of his God. In his Discourse he attempted to correct translations 
mentioning li in the context of more than just supreme order and its five virtues: piety, justice, 
religion, prudence, and faith.100 He even went as far as to theorize that it is possible for them to 
have misworded some of their theories, and that it is possible to interpret that they got close to 
Leibniz’s causation principles on their own: 
“They say of Heaven what we say of the beasts, namely that they act according to 
intelligence and as if they possessed it, although they do not possess it at all because they 
are directed by the supreme order of reason; which the Chinese call Li. When they say 
that the primal air or matter leaves the Li naturally and involuntarily, it could be they 
believe that God has created matter necessarily. But one could grant yet a better meaning 
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to their words, explaining them more fittingly: namely, that supreme Reason has been 
brought to that which is the most rational. It is possible they call the Li necessary, 
because it is determined and infallible; misusing the term "necessary" as many Europeans 
do.”101 
He further commended them, stating that they should be considered far from blameworthy for 
the conclusions they were able to come through, especially without the guidance offered to the 
people of Abrahamic religions and not to them. 
Spirits give God power, and if people were to gather in a morally sound and scientifically 
advanced society, this could only further highlight God’s goodness, wisdom and power. This 
solution he approved of, the merging of Europe and China in reformation of Christianity could 
have only further empowered God, and proved how good both he and his creations are as 
expressed by their new advanced society. Leibniz here completely credited his deity in the face 
of humanity’s triumph in creating the perfect state, governed by the faith in the perfect 
incorporeal being. This city of God, would have been a man-made city, cultivated from what we 
can adlib as the great cultural exchange, and the reverting back to natural theology, moving away 
from Europe’s diverse sects and the troubles they brought on. Leibniz here presented his 
fascination with God, and expresses this mystical way of how God’s city was the answer to both 
what should be in store for the next superior civilization, and how man could get closer to God 
from the experience, as a whole. This part of the Monadology rested on the shoulders of a 
Leibniz who thought he could prove his God’s might through working to create the perfect 
society for what he thought was the universe God favors. Essentially, Leibniz’s great plan to 
convert China to Christianity and reform the religion based off of ancient Chinese natural 
philosophy and theology, and thus create the perfectly ethical and enlightened society primarily 
aimed to create a plan to prove God’s might.  
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After Leibniz’s Discourse and other later attempts to argue in favor of the great cultural 
exchange, Pope Clement XI’s 1704 anti-accommodationist decree was made public in China in 
1707 and in 1709 in Europe, thus widening the gap between the continents on a spiritual level. 
This decision to refuse Chinese natural theology did not change in Catholicism until the end of 
the first half of the twentieth century. In 1724, most missionaries were forced to leave, and only 
the ones the court deemed useful remained to teach astronomy, thus concluding the abandonment 
of the plans that once held high expectations as an end product of a mutually spiritually 
rewarding partnership. 
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Conclusion 
 
Leibniz had faith in his own capacity to provide the best of all possible worlds, the one 
which he got to call home, with an efficient plan that in turn highlighted the perfections of God, 
as well as aligned with the optimistic projections of human potential God had entrusted humanity 
with. Leibniz’s plan was focused on demonstrating his deity’s excellence, by creating an 
environment that was morally superior and therefore deserving of even more from God: 
“This City of God, this truly universal monarchy, is a moral world in the natural world, 
and is the most exalted and most divine among the works of God; and it is in it that the 
glory of God really consists, for He would have no glory were not His greatness and His 
goodness known and admired by spirits [esprits]. It is also in relation to this divine City 
that God specially has goodness, while His wisdom and His power are manifested 
everywhere.”102  
If goodness could function as revealed knowledge, it would appear as if Leibniz’s rational 
theology could suffice to unlock it. Yet, in order to access rational theology, much of the dogma 
that had been weighing on all attempts at reforming Christianity had to be shed off. 
 It could only have been after understanding the importance of European knowledge in 
China, and how easily commodifiable mathematics, Western philosophy and other studies truly 
were that Leibniz turned to China in order for it to participate in his cultural exchange model. In 
1607, Father Matteo Ricci translated Euclid’s Elements of Geometry and thus made it available 
to Chinese military officers, farmers, workers, statesmen and pretty much anyone who would 
become interested in learning about this subject that was so vital and readily attainable in 
Europe.103  
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 Europe had a lot more knowledge to offer than a book on geometry, mostly prepared 
before Jesus was just a thought in heaven, as my mother would put it. After all, it was the birth-
continent of the university. Leibniz was very much aware of this, as he repeatedly emphasized 
how the Chinese lacked not only Christian revealed knowledge, but standard European doctrine. 
It was in the interests of both continents for this merger to have worked out, however it was 
primarily Leibniz’s dream and not the vision of the respective authorities of the two societies. 
Had the collective monarchs been on board, our world today could have been incredibly 
different:  “[w]hence it is easy to conclude that the totality of all spirits must compose the City of 
God, that is to say, the most perfect State that is possible, under the most perfect of 
Monarchs.”104 His utopian state may never have seen the light of day, but at least he tried, which 
in turn makes a world of difference. 
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